RAMS for Electrical Installation Work

Electrical installation work sits at the higher end of the risk spectrum on any construction or maintenance project. Shock, burn, arc flash, and fire are all credible outcomes when the work is poorly planned or the isolation procedure is skipped. A well-written RAMS removes that uncertainty by committing the team to a specific, sequenced set of controls before anyone picks up a tool.

Legal Basis

The duty to risk-assess rests on Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (MHSWR) regulation 3, which requires every employer to make a suitable and sufficient assessment of risks to employees and others who may be affected. The Electricity at Work Regulations 1989 (EAWR) then set the technical duties: regulation 4 requires that electrical systems are constructed, maintained and used so as to prevent danger; regulation 13 requires that dead working is the default and that conductors are made dead before work begins unless it is unreasonable to do so; regulation 14 permits live working only where all three conditions are satisfied simultaneously — it is unreasonable in all the circumstances for the conductor to be dead; it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the person to be at work on or near it; and suitable precautions are taken to prevent injury. Those conditions must all hold at once; meeting one or two is not enough.

Wiring design and installation must comply with BS 7671 (the IET Wiring Regulations). Where the work disturbs existing fabric in a pre-2000 building, a survey under the Control of Asbestos Regulations 2012 is a precondition — electrical routes frequently run through ceiling voids, risers, and partition cores where ACMs may be present.

Key Hazards and Controls — Hierarchy Order

**Eliminate** the hazard by decommissioning circuits permanently where the installation is being replaced outright. A circuit with no energy in it presents no electrical risk.

**Substitute** by scheduling work during planned shutdowns or off-peak periods so that circuits serving adjacent plant can be isolated without operational pressure to rush.

**Engineering controls — safe isolation** is the primary control for any energised conductor and must precede all other measures. The sequence is: identify the correct isolation point; isolate at the source (MCB, isolator, or fuse); apply a lock-off device and a danger tag in the operative's own name; prove dead using a GS38-compliant voltage indicator (two-pole, with fused leads no longer than appropriate for the voltage class, and probes with finger guards and limited exposed metal); test the proving unit before and after proving dead to confirm the instrument is functional. Do not proceed until the proving-dead check is complete.

Temporary equipotential bonding and earthing should be applied for work on larger systems where stored energy or induced voltage is a credible risk.

**Administrative controls:** only competent persons (EAWR reg 16 — sufficient knowledge and experience of the systems involved) may carry out the work or direct it. Permit-to-work systems must be used where circuits are fed from multiple sources or where other trades are working in the same area. The RAMS must document the exact circuit references to be isolated and who holds the lock-off keys.

**PPE last:** insulated tools to GS38 standards, arc-rated PPE rated to the prospective fault level, and insulating gloves and mats where residual risk from adjacent live parts cannot be eliminated. PPE is not a substitute for isolation.

Operatives must never attempt to isolate DNO-owned equipment or high-voltage switchgear. Where HV isolation or a DNO disconnection is required, the request must be made to the relevant network operator in advance with sufficient lead time built into the programme.

Where work is in a confined space — cable ducts, vaults, or sub-stations — a written rescue plan meeting Confined Spaces Regulations 1997 regulation 5 must be in place before entry. This includes a means of raising the alarm and a non-entry rescue method where feasible.

Common Failings That Get This RAMS Rejected

The most frequent reasons an electrical RAMS is returned are: no reference to EAWR 1989 and the basis on which dead working will be achieved; the safe isolation sequence described in general terms without specifying GS38-compliant equipment and the prove-before-and-after discipline; live working listed as a routine option rather than requiring all three regulation 14 conditions to be satisfied; competence evidence not referenced; and no mention of asbestos survey requirements where the building is pre-2000.

What the Document Must Include

The RAMS must cover: the scope and specific circuit references affected; the legal framework (MHSWR reg 3, EAWR 1989); identification of competent persons and their qualifications or accreditation; the step-by-step safe isolation procedure naming the locking and proving equipment to be used; the permit-to-work arrangement where multi-source supplies are involved; controls for adjacent live parts that cannot be isolated; asbestos survey status for existing fabric; confined space rescue plan where applicable; emergency arrangements including the location of the nearest HV isolation authority and DNO contact; and a review trigger if site conditions change.